Labor Law - Unemployment Compensation - Voluntary Termination Not Found Where There Is Meritorious Excuse for Refusal to Pay Union Dues Based on Religious Grounds. Nottelson v. ILHR Department, 94 Wis. 2d 106, 287 N.W.2d 763 (1980) by Gray, Kathleen A.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 64
Issue 1 Fall 1980 Article 9
Labor Law - Unemployment Compensation -
Voluntary Termination Not Found Where There Is
Meritorious Excuse for Refusal to Pay Union Dues
Based on Religious Grounds. Nottelson v. ILHR
Department, 94 Wis. 2d 106, 287 N.W.2d 763
(1980)
Kathleen A. Gray
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Kathleen A. Gray, Labor Law - Unemployment Compensation - Voluntary Termination Not Found Where There Is Meritorious Excuse for
Refusal to Pay Union Dues Based on Religious Grounds. Nottelson v. ILHR Department, 94 Wis. 2d 106, 287 N.W.2d 763 (1980), 64 Marq.
L. Rev. 203 (1980).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol64/iss1/9
NOTES
LABOR LAW - Unemployment Compensation -
Voluntary Termination Not Found Where There is
Meritorious Excuse for Refusal to Pay Union Dues
Based on Religious Grounds. Nottelson v. ILHR De-
partment, 94 Wis. 2d 106, 287 N.W.2d 763 (1980).
In Nottelson v. ILHR Department,1 the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court addressed the issue of whether an employee who
was discharged for refusing, on religious grounds, to pay union
dues had voluntarily terminated his employment without
good cause attributable to the employing unit. The Depart-
ment of Industry, Labor and Human Relations (DILHR) had
concluded that within the meaning of section 108.04(7)2 of the
statutes, claimant had voluntarily terminated his employment
and that the termination was without good cause attributable
to the employing unit. It therefore denied him unemployment
compensation benefits. The circuit court of Dane County af-
firmed.8 The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in a four-to-three de-
cision, reversed. It held that claimant's discharge was not a
voluntary termination because of the meritoriousness of his
excuse for failing to pay union dues, i.e., that this refusal was
based on religious beliefs and was protected by the provisions
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended in
1972.4
In reaching its decision, the court first examined the stan-
dard of judicial review to be applied to administrative agency
decisions. The court determined that in this particular case,
1. Nottelson v. ILHR Department, 94 Wis. 2d 106, 287 N.W.2d 763 (1980).
2. At the time claimant was discharged, Wis. STAT. § 108.04(7) (1975) provided:
(7) Voluntary Termination of Employment. (a) If an employe terminates
his or her employment with an employing unit, the employe shall be ineligible
for any benefits for the week of termination and thereafter until he or she has
again been employed within at least 4 weeks and has earned wages of at least
$200, except as otherwise provided in this subsection.
(b) Paragraph (a) shall not apply if the department determines that the
employe terminated his employment with good cause attributable to the em-
ploying unit.
3. Nottelson v. DILHR and A.O. Smith Corp., [1979] UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH) 1
1975.767 (1977).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. 1975).
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the issue was a question of law and therefore it was appropri-
ate for the court to substitute its judgment for that of the
agency.5 Then, in making its redetermination of claimant's eli-
gibility for unemployment compensation benefits, the court
reviewed the case law definition of "voluntary termination"
which focuses on whether an employee's conduct has been in-
consistent with the continuation of the employee-employer re-
lationship.' Finally, the court applied this statutory concept
to the factual situation. Although the claimant was bringing a
separate federal court action under Title VII for damages and
injunctive relief, the court believed that DILHR should have
considered the effect of the Civil Rights Act when reviewing
his conduct for purposes of unemployment compensation. The
court, therefore, undertook a review of the language and legis-
lative history of Title VII, its judicial interpretation, the con-
duct of the employer and union, and an Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) decision favorable to claim-
ant. It found that all these factors established a meritorious
justification for claimant's refusal to pay dues. That is, the
court found that there was a reasonable basis to believe that
Title VII exempted claimant from the obligation to pay dues,
and that absent this obligation, his conduct was not inconsis-
tent with the continuation of the employee-employer relation-
ship. Therefore, he had not voluntarily terminated his em-
ployment and was entitled to unemployment compensation.7
Because of the complexity of this case, this note will, in
addition to setting forth the facts, consider the following ar-
eas: the scope of judicial review, the definitions of statutory
terms, the application of the statutory concept to the factual
situation (including the language of Title VII and judicial in-
terpretations of Title VII) and the dissent.
I. FACTUAL SETTING
"[T]his case raises for the first time the application of the
state unemployment compensation act to a fact situation
which involves the interplay of an employee's and employer's
rights and obligations under a union security agreement and
5. 94 Wis. 2d at 113-18, 287 N.W.2d at 767-69.
6. Id. at 118-19, 287 N.W.2d at 769-70.
7. Id. at 120-25, 287 N.W.2d at 770-72.
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the federal civil rights act."" Because of the uniqueness of the
factual situation, it will be set out in some detail.
Nottelson was hired by A.O. Smith in October of 1947.
From that time until January of 1975, he paid union dues in
conformity with the labor agreement between Smith and the
union. That contract included a union security agreement
which made union membership and payment of dues a condi-
tion of employment.9 In 1966, claimant had become a member
of the Seventh Day Adventist Church. It was a church tenet
that its members not join or financially support a labor union.
By December of 1974, Nottelson had decided that, because of
his religious beliefs, he could no longer continue paying dues.
Neither the sincerity of his beliefs nor his value as an em-
ployee was questioned.10 He met with representatives of the
union several times between December, 1974 and his dis-
charge in July, 1975, to see if an accommodation could be
reached which would allow him to retain his employment
without paying union dues. He suggested donating the
equivalent of his dues to a nonreligious, nonunion charity.
The union rejected this proposal. Nottelson also met with
Smith personnel during this time to see if there was anything
they could do to help resolve the conflict. There was no record
of any attempt by Smith to do so.""
In March, 1975, the claimant filed a grievance with the
EEOC charging both Smith and the union with religious dis-
crimination. On April 15, 1975, the union notified Smith that
claimant had been expelled from the union for failure to pay
dues. Later in April, claimant obtained a temporary re-
straining order from the federal district court preventing his
discharge by Smith pending final disposition of his EEOC
complaint. On July 3, the EEOC found "reasonable cause" to
8. Id. at 117, 287 N.W.2d at 769.
9. Article I(B)(2) of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between A.O. Smith and
Smith Steel Workers in effect at the time claimant was discharged provided:
Each employee hired or rehired on or after April 1, 1947, if retained in the
employment of the company, shall no later than thirty (30) days after date of
hire or date of execution of this Agreement, whichever is the later, become and
remain a member in good standing in said labor organization as a condition of
continued employment.
94 Wis. 2d at 110 n.1, 287 N.W.2d at 765 n.1.
10. Id. at 110, 287 N.W.2d at 765.
11. Id. at 110-11, 287 N.W.2d at 765-66.
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believe that the union and Smith had discriminated against
claimant in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.12
However, on July 10, 1975, the federal court denied claimant's
request for a preliminary injunction to prevent his discharge s
and on July 11, he was fired.14
Claimant then applied for and received unemployment
compensation. However, at Smith's request, an appeal tribu-
nal reviewed the initial determination. It found claimant to be
ineligible for benefits, holding that his failure to pay union
dues constituted a voluntary termination of his employment
within the meaning of section 108.04(7) of the statutes, and
that such termination was not with good cause attributable to
the employing unit. He was ordered to repay the $1,582 re-
ceived up to that time. During the department's review,
claimant testified that Smith had told him that refusal to pay
union dues would result in dismissal; that he had made in-
quiiy about his legal rights; and that he believed that federal
law would prevent his discharge. The supreme court con-
cluded, based on this testimony and his actions between De-
cember, 1974 and July, 1975, that: "The record is clear that
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. V 1975) provides in part: "If the Commission
determines after such investigation that there is reasonable cause to believe that the
charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful
employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persua-
sion." EEOC informed claimant on July 21, 1975, that its conciliation efforts had
failed and that he had a right to sue in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)
(Supp. V 1975); Annot., 5 A.L.R. Fed. 334 (1970).
13. Nottelson v. A.O. Smith Corp., 397 F. Supp. 928 (E.D. Wis. 1975). The court
held that it lacked jurisdiction under Title VII to grant the preliminary injunctive
relief because Nottelson had not yet exhausted his administrative remedies (i.e.,
EEOC had not yet issued a right to sue notice). The court further noted that 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(2) provides that the Commission may bring an action for appro-
priate preliminary relief pending final disposition of a charge, but that it did not do
so in this case. The court dismissed the complaint without prejudice to reinstatement.
After receiving the right to sue notice, claimant was allowed to amend his original
complaint. In Nottelson v. A.O. Smith Corp., 423 F. Supp. 1345 (E.D. Wis. 1976) the
court refused to dismiss the action based on Title VII and the United States Consti-
tution. This federal suit was pending at the time of the oral argument before the
Wisconsin court on the unemployment compensation question. On Dec. 10, 1979, in
Nottelson v. A.O. Smith Corp., 481 F. Supp. 756 (E.D. Wis. 1979) the Federal District
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin rendered judgment for the plaintiff on his
claim under Title VII.
14. 94 Wis. 2d at 111-12, 287 N.W.2d at 766.
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the claimant did not want to quit his employment and that he
resisted being discharged."1
II. SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Before taking up the central question of the case -
whether claimant's conduct constituted a voluntary termina-
tion of his employment without good cause attributable to the
employing unit, which could make him ineligible for unem-
ployment compensation - the court spends some time outlin-
ing its authority to review this question. The statutes give
general guidance. Within the chapter on unemployment com-
pensation, section 108.09(7) provides for judicial review of
commission decisions.16 It states that judicial review shall be
confined to questions of law and that the provisions of chap-
ter 102,17 with respect to judicial review of orders 'and awards,
shall also apply to review under section 108.09(7). Section
102.23 provides in part that the commission's findings of fact
are conclusive as long as they are supported by credible and
substantial evidence.18 Thus, on appeal, a court would be
15. Id. at 112, 287 N.W.2d at 766.
16. Wis. STAT. § 108.09(7) (1977) provides:
(7) Judicial Review. (a) Either party may commence judicial action for
the review of a decision of the commission under this chapter after exhausting
the remedies provided under this section if the party has commenced such ju-
dicial action in accordance with s. 102.23 within 30 days after a decision of the
commission is mailed to a party's last known address.
(b) Any judicial review under this chapter shall be confined to questions of
law, and the provisions of ch. 102 with respect to judicial review of orders and
awards shall likewise apply to any decision of the commission reviewed under
this section. In any such judicial action the commission may appear by any
qualified attorney who is a regular salaried employe of the department and has
been designated by it for this purpose, or at the commission's request by the
department of justice.
(c) If, as a result of judicial review of a commission decision denying an
employe's eligibility for benefits, it is finally determined that benefits are paya-
ble, they shall be calculated as of the date of the commission's decision.
17. Chapter 102 is Wisconsin's worker's compensation statute.
18. Wis. STAT. § 102.23 (1977) provides in part:
Judicial review. (1) The findings of fact made by the commission acting
within its powers shall, in the absence of fraud, be conclusive. ...
(d) Upon such hearing, the court may confirm or set aside such order or
award; and any judgment which may theretofore have been rendered thereon;
but the same shall be set aside only upon the following grounds:
1. That the commission acted without or in excess of its powers.
2. That the order or award was procured by fraud.
1980]
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bound by the commission's findings of fact (when supported
by credible evidence) but not by its conclusions of law. How-
ever, when the issue involves a mixed question of law and fact,
the court must first decide whether it will be treated as a
question of law or a question of fact. A mixed question arises
when an administrative agency applies a statutory concept to
a particular factual situation. For example, "Was the sales-
man acting within the scope of his employment?"; "Was the
electric rate fair and equitable?"; and, in the present case,
"Did claimant voluntarily terminate his employment without
good cause attributable to the employing unit?"19 Courts have
taken two approaches to reviewing administrative decisions
which apply legal concepts to the facts of a case. Professor
Davis characterizes these as the analytical approach and the
practical approach.20
In the analytical approach, the court separates the
agency's decision into questions of fact and questions of law
and applies the reasonableness test21 to the facts and substi-
tutes its judgment on the law.2 2 After deciding to substitute
its judgment, the court may nevertheless affirm the agency's
decision. As to the basis for the separation, Davis states that
questions of fact are those concerned with "what happened, or
the conditions or circumstances or motives" and that ques-
tions of law are those concerned with "the meaning to be as-
signed to a legal concept, or a refinement of that meaning in
3. That the findings of fact by the commission do not support the order or
award.
(6) If the commission's order or award depends on any fact found by the
commission, the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the commis-
sion as to the weight or credibility of the evidence on any finding of fact. The
court may, however, set aside the commission's order or award and remand the
case to the commission if the commission's order or award depends on any
material and controverted finding of fact that is not supported by credible and
substantial evidence.
19. 94 Wis. 2d at 115, 287 N.W.2d at 768.
20. 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 30.01-.14 (1958 & Supp. 1970 &
1980) [hereinafter cited as DAVIS].
21. Under Wis. STAT. § 102.23(6) a factual finding would be set aside only if it was
"not supported by credible and substantial evidence."
22. DAVIS, supra note 20, § 30.01.
23. Comment, The Scope of Judicial Review of Administrative Agency Decisions
in Wisconsin, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 554.
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the light of the particular facts." '24 Wisconsin case law pro-
vides similar definitions, holding that "a person's acts, or his
intent in doing such acts, are questions of fact" while
"whether the facts fulfill a particular legal standard" are ques-
tions of law.25 Thus, if a court follows the analytical approach
and the dispute focuses on the question of law, the court may
substitute its judgment for that of the agency.
However, courts sometimes follow the practical rather than
the analytical approach.26 This occurs when the court declines
to substitute its judgment on what is analytically a question
of law. A court can accomplish this in one of two ways. First,
it can label an agency's conclusion of law as a question of fact
and apply only the credible evidence test on review.27 Second,
without attempting to separate law from fact, the court can
simply affirm the agency's decision because it has a "rational
basis. '28
But how does a court decide whether to apply the analyti-
cal or the practical approach; when will it substitute its judg-
ment and when will it refrain from doing so? A number of
factors have been advanced as bases for courts' decisions in
this area, including the one which seems central in Nottelson,
i.e., judicial versus administrative expertise.29
The court in Nottelson follows the analytical approach.
Recognizing the question facing it as a mixed one of fact and
law, the court cites numerous Wisconsin cases which have
held that "the determination of whether the facts fulfill a par-
ticular legal standard is a question of law." 0 However, the
court itself acknowledges in a note that its decisions have not
24. DAvis, supra note 20, § 30.01, at 190.
25. Cheese v. Industrial Comm'n, 21 Wis. 2d 8, 15, 123 N.W.2d 553, 557 (1963).
26. DAvis, supra note 20, § 30.01.
27. Id. §§ 30.02-.04. See, e.g., Transport Oil, Inc. v. Cummings, 54 Wis. 2d 256,
195 N.W.2d 649 (1972). Instead of treating the question of whether particular con-
duct amounted to misconduct within the meaning of the unemployment compensa-
tion statutes, the court treated the question as one of fact, applying the credible evi-
dence test.
28. DAVIs, supra note 20, § 30.05.
29. 94 Wis. 2d at 117, 287 N.W.2d at 769. In addition to comparative qualifica-
tions of courts and agencies, Davis discusses the amount of authority delegated to the
administrative agency and the tendency of courts to substitute their judgment on
important generalizations but not on narrow applications. DAvIs, supra note 20, §9
30.08-.11.
30. 94 Wis. 2d at 116, 287 N.W.2d at 768.
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always been consistent on this issue.3'
Clearly, the choice of review standards is highly discretion-
ary. And while courts often fail to articulate the reasons for
their choice of a particular standard in a given case,32 the Not-
telson court was explicit on why it has chosen to substitute its
judgment. The court acknowledged that agency expertise,
though not controlling on a question of law, should he given
weight.3 However, the court went on to state why, in this par-
ticular instance, it felt that its own expertise is the greater of
the two:
It appears that the commission has not developed expertise
or a body of precedent on this question [i.e., application of
unemployment compensation law to a situation involving a
union security agreement and the federal civil rights act].
Indeed the commission failed to consider the implications of
the federal civil rights act in making its determination. 4
Accepting the commission's findings of fact, the court con-
cluded that it must nevertheless reject its conclusion of law,
i.e., that Nottelson voluntarily terminated his employment.3 5
III. STATUTORY TERMS DEFINED
Before applying the statutory concepts to the facts of the
case, the court reviewed the meaning of the terms as defined
by case law. While section 108.04(7)3' provides that an em-
ployee who voluntarily terminates his employment is ineligi-
31. Id. at 115, 287 N.W.2d at 768. Dentici v. Industrial Comm'n, 264 Wis. 181, 58
N.W.2d 717 (1953) illustrates this inconsistency quite graphically. Addressing the
same issue of whether particular conduct constituted a voluntary termination within
the meaning of chapter 108, the Dentici court followed the practical approach and
labelled the question one of fact.
32. DAvis, supra note 20, § 30.14.
33. 94 Wis. 2d at 117, 287 N.W.2d at 768.
34. Id. at 117, 287 N.W.2d at 769. Professor Davis comments in this regard:
Although courts often emphasize - and sometimes overemphasize - agency
expertise, they do not usually emphasize that judges, not agencies, are the ex-
perts or comparatively the experts in many areas, including constitutional law,
common law, ethics, overall philosophy of law and government, judge-made
law developed through statutory interpretation, most analysis of legislative his-
tory, fair procedure, and problems transcending the particular field of the
agency.
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 30.06, at 552 (3d ed. 1972).
35. 94 Wis. 2d at 117-18, 287 N.W.2d at 769.
36. See note 2 supra.
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ble for benefits, the statute does not define voluntary termina-
tion. As the instant case illustrates, the commission has found
"voluntary termination" even in cases where the employee did
not say "I quit" but rather was fired. The court cited Dentici
v. Industrial Commission 7 as setting forth the test to deter-
mine whether a discharge constitutes a voluntary termination.
"When an employee shows that he intends to leave his em-
ployment and indicates such intention by word or manner of
action, or by conduct inconsistent with the continuation of the
employee-employer relationship, it must be held,. . that the
employee intended and did leave his employment voluntarily
.... "8 This test was reaffirmed in Fish v. White Equipment
Sales & Service, Inc. 9 and Hanmer v. ILHR Department.0
Section 108.04(7) also sets out several exceptions to the
voluntary termination rule, i.e., situations in which an em-
ployee who has voluntarily terminated may still be eligible for
benefits. One of these allows the employee to collect benefits
if he voluntarily terminated "with good cause attributable to
the employing unit. '41 Kessler v. Industrial Commission42 de-
fines this as " ' some act or omission by the employer' consti-
tuting a cause which justifies the quitting. Good cause for
quitting attributable to the employer as distinguished from
discharge must involve some fault on his part and must be
real and substantial. '4 The appeal tribunal of DILHR found
that Nottelson did not fall within the "good cause attributa-
ble to the employing unit" exception. But the supreme court
never reached the question because it found no voluntary ter-
mination in the first instance.
Before leaving the area of statutory definition, it is signifi-
cant to note that chapter 108 does not contain an exception to
the voluntary termination rule on the basis of a "compelling
personal reason." When Wisconsin's Unemployment Compen-
sation Act was passed in 1932, the only exemption to the vol-
untary termination disqualification was for "good cause at-
37. 264 Wis. 181, 58 N.W.2d 717 (1953).
38. Id. at 186, 58 N.W.2d at 720.
39. 64 Wis. 2d 737, 221 N.W.2d 864 (1974).
40. 92 Wis. 2d 90, 284 N.W.2d 587 (1979).
41. See subparagraph b, note 2, supra.
42. 27 Wis. 2d 398, 134 N.W.2d 412 (1965).
43. Id. at 401, 134 N.W.2d at 414.
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tributable to the employing unit."' 4 However, in 1945, the Act
was amended to include an exemption for an employee who
voluntarily terminated his employment for a "compelling per-
sonal reason. '45 The court elaborated on the meaning of
"compelling personal reason" in Western Printing and Litho-
graphing Co. v. Industrial Commission.48 The case involved
an unemancipated, nineteen-year-old woman who quit her job
when her parents insisted that she move with them to Califor-
nia. The court quoted the commission's interpretation of the
statutory term with approval:
The Commission construes 'compelling personal reason'
to be such a reason as would impel the same or similar ac-
tion by an ordinary reasonable individual under the same or
similar circumstances.
'Compelling personal reason' requires considerations or
motives which leave a claimant no reasonable alternative
but to terminate his employment. It exists only when, be-
cause of his personal circumstances, it would be unreasona-
ble to expect an employee to continue in his job.47
The "compelling personal reason" exemption was removed in
1965 and a more limited exception for workers who quit be-
cause of their own or a family member's health was substi-
tuted.48 The legislature has said, in effect, that personal rea-
sons (i.e., not attributable to the employer) for leaving one's
employment, no matter how significant, will not be considered
when determining eligibility for unemployment benefits. Thus
the court could not (and did not) grant Nottelson benefits on
the grounds that his religious beliefs provided a compelling
personal reason for his voluntary termination. Rather, the
court held that Nottelson's termination was not "voluntary;"
under the Dentici test, his conduct was not inconsistent with
the continuation of the employee-employer relationship.
44. 1931 Wis. Laws, Special Session ch. 20.
45. 1945 Wis. Laws ch. 354. Wis. STAT. § 108.04(7)(c) (1945) provided:
Paragraph (a) shall not apply if the commission determines that the em-
ployee terminated his employment for compelling personal reason; provided
that, if the commission determines that he is physically unable to work or sub-
stantially unavailable for work, he shall be eligible while such inability or un-
availability continues.
46. 260 Wis. 124, 50 N.W.2d 410 (1951).
47. Id. at 131, 50 N.W.2d at 413.
48. 1965 Wis. Laws ch. 10.
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IV. APPLICATION OF THE STATUTORY CONCEPT TO THE
FACTUAL SETTING
DILHR had found that the claimant's conduct - failing
to pay dues while knowing that union membership was a con-
dition of employment - was inconsistent with the continua-
tion of the employee-employer relationship and so was a vol-
untary termination. The court said the flaw in the
commission's approach was that it assumed that the labor
agreement required, without exception, that all employees pay
dues.49 It failed to take into account that the federal Civil
Rights Act might relieve an employee whose religious beliefs
forbade union membership from the obligation to pay dues.5 0
Such an employee would not be acting inconsistently with the
employee-employer relationship when he refused to pay union
dues. The court then proceeded to review "the meritorious-
ness of his excuse; that is, whether his religious beliefs as pro-
tected by the federal Civil Rights Act relieved him of his obli-
gation to pay dues." 51 It must be borne in mind that when the
court speaks of the "meritoriousness of his excuse," it is not
speaking of the validity of any personal reasons Nottelson
may have had for his refusal. Rather, the court is objectively
assessing whether, under the factual situation involved, there
is a reasonable basis to believe that the federal Civil Rights
Act relieved Nottelson of the obligation to pay dues.
A. The Language of Title VII
The court first looked to the language of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.52 The Act makes it unlawful for an
49. 94 Wis. 2d at 121, 287 N.W.2d at 770.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970) provides in part-
Unlawful employment practices
(a) Employer practices. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer-
(1)... to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . . religion
(c) Labor organization practices. It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for a labor organization-
(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discrimi-
19801
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employer to discharge or to discriminate against an employee
because of his religion. It also prohibits unions from discrimi-
nating against members on the basis of religion or causing the
employer to do so. As originally enacted, Title VII did not de-
fine precisely what practices were being protected. In 1967,
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission promul-
gated guidelines which required employers to make reasonable
accommodation, short of undue hardship, to the religious
needs of employees.5 3 After one court construed these guide-
lines very narrowly and expressed doubts about the EEOC's
power to adopt them,5 Congress amended Title VII in 1972 to
incorporate the guidelines into a definition of religion. "The
term 'religion' includes all aspects of religious observance and
practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates
that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's
or prospective employee's religious observance or practice
without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's bus-
iness." 55 This clarified the employer's affirmative duty to ac-
commodate, although what constituted "reasonable accommo-
dation" in a given fact situation was still unresolved.
B. Judicial Interpretation of Title VII
The Wisconsin court then turned to judicial interpretation
of the Civil Rights Act. The Nottelson court cited five appeals
court cases 5s in three circuits decided after the 1972 amend-
ment 57 which addressed the conflict between an employee's
nate against, any individual because of his ... religion ....
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
individual in violation of this section.
53. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1967).
54. Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd, 402 U.S. 689
(1971) (equally divided court).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Supp. V 1975).
56. See generally, Comment, Union Security Clauses and Religious Discrimina-
tion in Employment, 6 N. Ky. L. Rav. 155-69 (1979); Note, 47 TENN. L. REv. 212-32
(1979); 4 A. LARsoN, EMPLOYmENT DIsCIMINATION § 92.22 (1979 and Supplement).
57. Prior to the 1972 Title VII amendment the federal courts of appeals had con-
sistently rejected constitutional challenges to union security agreements as impeding
the free exercise of religion. See Hammond v. United Papermakers & Paperworkers
Union, 462 F.2d 174 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1028 (1972); Linscott v. Millers
Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 872 (1971); Gray v. Gulf, Mo-
bile & Ohio R.R. Co., 429 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1001
(1971).
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rights under Title VII and union security clauses as sanc-
tioned in section 8(a)(3) of the Taft-Hartley Act.58 However,
only one, Yott v. North American Rockwell Corp.,59 was de-
cided prior to Nottelson's discharge in 1975.
The fact situation in Yott was very similar to the instant
case - a Seventh Day Adventist was discharged for his re-
fusal to pay union dues after his employer entered into a labor
agreement which included a union security clause. The court
held that both the employer and the union had a duty to ac-
commodate.60 However, before remanding the case to the dis-
trict court for a determination of whether a reasonable accom-
modation could be reached, the court of appeals said:
We note, however, that this is not a "refusal to work"
case in which a reasonable accommodation is easily pro-
vided. We are not certain that any accommodation is availa-
ble. If appellees are able to demonstrate that any suggested
accommodation would impose undue hardship on the Union
or on the employer's business then Yott's discrimination
claim should fail.e1
Faced with this skepticism, it would be difficult to conclude
on the basis of Yott alone that Title VII mandates so great an
accommodation as an exemption from the obligation to pay
dues. Had Smith and the union made any effort at accommo-
dation, the Wisconsin Supreme Court might have had a more
difficult time holding that, under the law as it stood in 1975,
Nottelson had a "meritorious excuse" for his conduct. How-
ever, because Smith and the union were required by Yott to
make some effort at accommodation and because they failed
Claimant ii the instant case also made a first amendnient argument which was
not taken up by the Wisconsin court. See Brief for Appellant at 29-50.
58. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976).
59. 501 F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928 (1980).
60. Id. at 403.
61. Id. (footnote omitted). On remand, the district court declared 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(j) to be unconstitutional and ruled that accommodations proposed by Yott
were insufficient. Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 428 F. Supp. 763 (C.D. Cal.
1977). On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court's decision
that Yott's religious beliefs could not reasonably be accommodated was not clearly
erroneous. The court of appeals did not reach the constitutional question. Yott v.
North Am. Rockwell Corp., 602 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928
(1980). Although the Ninth Circuit's decision might suggest a different result than
that reached by the Wisconsin court, it must be borne in mind that this decision was
rendered after Nottelson v. ILHR Dept.
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to do so, there was reasonable basis to believe that Smith had
violated Title VII by discharging him. The court could legiti-
mately find that Nottelson had reason to believe that he could
not lawfully be discharged and therefore that his conduct was
not inconsistent with the employment relationship.
While Yott was the only union security clause/Title VII
case decided prior to Nottelson's discharge, it seems likely
that the Wisconsin court was influenced by subsequent ap-
peals court decisions in the area. A review of four union secur-
ity clause/Title VII cases and the one "refusal to work" case
in which the Supreme Court sought to clarify the meaning of
"reasonable accommodation" and "undue hardship" will indi-
cate the state of the law at the time Nottelson was decided.
In Cooper v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Divi-
sion,62 faced with the same general fact situation as in Yott,
the Fifth Circuit held that section 8(a)(3) of the Taft-Hartley
Act authorizing union security agreements was not superior to
the provisions of Title VII,63 and that Title VII placed a duty
to accommodate on both the union and employer.64 However,
there was a split on what form this accommodation could rea-
sonably take. Two of the judges felt that accommodation
could extend to nonpayment of union dues"6 while the third
thought that this could never be a reasonable accommoda-
tion.6 The final determination on the form of accommodation
was left to the district court on remand. Thus, Cooper lends
greater support to the Wisconsin court's view that Nottelson
had a meritorious excuse for refusing to pay dues, since he
might well have been exempted from the obligation under a
reasonable accommodation. The decision in Cooper was not
unanimous, however, and a Supreme Court decision the fol-
lowing year seemed to herald a far narrower definition of "rea-
sonable accommodation" and "undue hardship. '67
In Trans World Airlines v. Hardison,68 which involved a
62. 533 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1977).
63. Id. at 169.
64. Id. at 170.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 175.
67. Frantz, Religious Discrimination in Employment: An Examination of the
Employer's Duty to Accommodate, 1979 DET. C.L. Rav. 205-39.
68. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
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religious discrimination suit brought under the same Title VII
provisions as were involved in the union security clause cases,
the Supreme Court upheld the discharge of an employee
based on his refusal to work on Saturdays, his Sabbath.69 The
Court did so because it found that any of the suggested ac-
commodations (paying overtime to a substitute, using supervi-
sory personnel to replace Hardison, etc.) would have involved
greater than de minimus cost to TWA. Thus, the Court held
that any accommodation involving greater than de minimus
cost constituted undue hardship.70 The Court further noted
that accommodating the religious needs of one employee can-
not result in discrimination against other employees.7 1 This
holding cast doubt on whether refusal to pay union dues could
be a reasonable accommodation. It is arguable that such a re-
fusal involves greater than de minimus cost to the union and
that it places a disproportionate burden on other union
members.
The first union security clause case decided subsequent to
Hardison was McDaniel v. Essex International, Inc.7 2 Again,
an employee refused to join or to financially support a labor
organization due to her religious beliefs. She offered to pay an
equivalent amount to a nonreligious charity. She also offered
to pay the union an amount equivalent to the percentage of
the union budget used for purposes which did not violate her
religious beliefs. Neither offer was accepted and she was dis-
charged. The district court rejected the employee's Title VII
claim. The court of appeals reversed, making only limited use
of the Hardison decision. It made no reference to the de mini-
mus cost definition of undue hardship nor to the emphasis on
equal treatment of all employees. It cited the high court only
69. Hardison worked in a department that operated 24 hours a day and under the
labor agreement shift assignments were determined by seniority. After he voluntarily
transferred to a new department he lost his seniority rights which had previously
allowed him to avoid Saturday work. The union refused to allow Hardison his shift
preference because this would have violated the seniority provisions of the contract.
TWA refused his suggestion that he be allowed to work a four day week because this
would have reduced the efficiency of his department. It also refused to use supervi-
sory personnel to replace him or to pay union personnel overtime to do so. Id. at 66-
69.
70. Id. at 84.
71. Id. at 81.
72. 571 F.2d 338 (6th Cir. 1978).
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for the proposition that Title VII requires "some effort to ac-
commodate an employee's religious needs." ' The court of ap-
peals then went on to hold that the burden of making initial
efforts at accommodation or of demonstrating why accommo-
dation would cause undue hardship is on the employer and
the union. 4 The court further rejected the "hypothetical
hardship" approach taken by the district court when it con-
cluded, without any factual support in the record, that non-
payment of dues would cause undue hardship to the union.75
This case, then, lends support to the finding that someone like
Nottelson could have a meritorious excuse for refusing to pay
union dues. The Sixth Circuit declined to adopt the narrow
definition of reasonable accommodation set forth in Hardison
and, indeed, placed a greater burden on the employer and
union. Not only must they make an effort at accommodation,
but they must take the initiative (after being informed that
an employee's refusal to pay is motivated by religious belief)
in suggesting accommodations and they must bear the bur-
den, if no accommodation can be reached, of demonstrating
undue hardship.
The Ninth Circuit went even further in rejecting the con-
fines of Hardison. Anderson v. General Dynamics Convair
Aerospace Division8 again involved the discharge of a Sev-
enth Day Adventist for refusal to pay union dues. Here, the
employee suggested that, in lieu of union dues, he would make
an equivalent payment to a charity of his choice. Neither the
employer nor the union made any attempt at accommodation.
The circuit court reversed the district court's finding that the
employee's actions caused an undue hardship on the union.
After noting that what constitutes undue hardship turns on
the reasonableness of the conduct of the parties under the cir-
cumstances of each case, 7 the court held that the union had
failed to carry its burden of proving that it could not reasona-
bly accommodate plaintiff's religious beliefs without undue
hardship.7 8 The fact that Anderson's suggested accommoda-
73. Id. at 342.
74. Id. at 343.
75. Id.
76. 589 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979).
77. Id. at 400.
78. Id. at 402.
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tion may have been defective was immaterial because the bur-
den was on the employer and the union to take initial steps
toward accommodation.7 9 The court also rejected employer's
and union's argument that the creation of "free-riders" was an
undue hardship because no proof was offered other than gen-
eral sentiments against free-riders.80 The court concluded:
Undue hardship means something greater than hardship.
Undue hardship cannot be proved by assumptions nor by
opinions based on hypothetical facts. Even proof that em-
ployees would grumble about a particular accommodation is
not enough to establish undue hardship.81
On the same day, the Ninth Circuit decided Burns v.
Southern Pacific Transportation Co.,8 2 another union security
clause case. Here, the court cited Hardison for the proposition
that undue hardship is demonstrated "where the impacts
upon co-workers or costs are greater than de minimus."83 The
court then applied this to the specific facts of the case. As in
Anderson, it rejected an argument that resentment among co-
workers generated by a free-rider would constitute an undue
hardship. "An employer or union would have to show, as in
Hardison, actual imposition on co-workers or disruption of
the work routine. '84 The court also rejected the argument that
the loss of Burns' dues or the administrative cost of alterna-
tive payments would create an undue hardship on the union.
The court found that the loss of Burns' $19 per month was de
minimus8 5
Thus the Ninth Circuit did not apply the Hardison deci-
sion to narrow employer responsibility to make reasonable ac-
commodation. In contrast to Hardison, where the Supreme
79. Id. at 401.
80. Id. at 402.
81. Id. On remand, the district court held that the reasonable accommodation ob-
ligation of Title VII violates the establishment clause and entered judgment in favor
of the employer and the union. 489 F. Supp. 782 (S.D. Cal. 1980).
82. 589 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979).
83. Id. at 406.
84. Id. at 407.
* 85. Id. On remand, the district court found that the payment of a sum of money
equivalent to the amount of union dues to charity was a reasonable accommodation
to Burns and was not an undue hardship on the employer or the union. The court
further held that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) is not an unconstitutional establishment of
religion. [1979] 20 EMPL. PRAc. DEC. (CCH) 1 30, 183.
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Court had found that occasional overtime payments by TWA
involved greater than de minimus cost,86 this court of appeals
found that $19 per month is de minimus. In addition, Burns
held that the inequitable treatment of employees which con-
cerned the high court could not be demonstrated merely by
the fact that each employee in a union local might have to pay
an additional few cents per month because of an accommoda-
tion to one employee's religion. 7
The union security clause cases decided after Yott and
cited by the Wisconsin court, therefore, continued to hold
that employers and unions bear a responsibility to make rea-
sonable accommodation to employees' religious beliefs. In-
deed, these subsequent cases largely erased the doubts ex-
pressed in Yott about the extent of accommodation required
by holding that refusal to pay dues might, in a particular situ-
ation, be a reasonable accommodation. Viewing the facts of
the Nottelson case in light of 1975 case law (i.e., Yott), the
Wisconsin court, because of the failure by Smith and the
union to make any attempt at accommodation, found reason
to believe that Nottelson could not lawfully be discharged;
therefore, his conduct was not inconsistent with the employ-
ment relationship. The court's belief was undoubtedly further
influenced by the cases decided after Nottelson's discharge -
Cooper, McDaniel, Anderson and Burns - which indicated
that refusal to pay dues might constitute a reasonable accom-
modation in certain situations.
C. Conduct of the Employer and the EEOC Decision
Following its consideration of judicial interpretation of Ti-
tle VII, the Wisconsin court reviewed the conduct of the em-
ployer in the case (i.e., Smith's failure to make any attempt at
accommodation)88 and the EEOC decision favorable to Not-
telson.89 And, after a disclaimer to the effect that its decision
on the meritoriousness of Nottelson's excuse for unemploy-
ment compensation purposes had no bearing on the outcome
of any federal court action,90 the court concluded:
86. 432 U.s. at 84.
87. 589 F.2d at 407.
88. 94 Wis. 2d at 123-24, 287 N.W.2d at 771-72.
89. Id. at 124, 287 N.W.2d at 772.
90. Id. at 125, 287 N.W.2d at 772.
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Considering the language and legislative history of the
federal Civil Rights Act, the judicial interpretations of the
Act, the EEOC determination in claimant's favor, and the
conduct of the union and A.O. Smith, the claimant had mer-
itorious justification for his assertion that he need not pay
union dues and that he could retain his status as an
employee.
.... For purposes of determining whether claimant's
discharge can be characterized as a "voluntary termination,"
we conclude that, because claimant had meritorious justifi-
cation for his failure to pay dues, his conduct was not incon-
sistent with his continuation of the employee-employer
relation.9 1
V. THE DISSENT
The dissent raised a variety of objections to the majority
approach. First, it expressed concern over whether the major-
ity would allow compensation to a person who objected to
paying union dues "for other reasons. '9 2 The language does
not make it entirely clear whether this refers to a person who
objects for purely secular reasons or to one who objects for
religious reasons, but is not a member of a religion which pro-
hibits union membership. If the justices are referring to a sec-
ular reason, the answer is clearly "No," unless the secular rea-
son is somehow protected by Title VII or some other federal
legislation. The majority did not hold that Nottelson was enti-
tled to benefits because his objection was sincerely held, but
rather because, viewed objectively, his refusal was afforded
protection under the provisions of the Civil Rights Act. If the
dissenters are asking whether the majority would award com-
pensation to someone discharged for refusing to pay union
dues on religious grounds, although not a member of a religion
professing that tenet, the answer might well be "Yes." The
Title VII definition of religion is an expansive one.13 However,
for DILHR to make a determination on the "meritoriousness
of the excuse" in such a case would admittedly be much more
difficult.
The dissent then shifted its focus to an argument that
91. Id. at 124-25, 287 N.W.2d at 772 (footnote omitted).
92. Id. at 126, 287 N.W.2d at 772.
93. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
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claimant voluntarily terminated because he effectively quit
when he chose to follow a mandate of his conscience rather
than to conform to the union security agreement.9 But as the
facts demonstrate, Nottelson believed that the law would pro-
tect him in refusing to pay dues while continuing to work and
the majority found that there was reasonable basis in fact for
such a belief.
Next, the dissenters suggested that perhaps the majority
meant to hold that the claimant voluntarily terminated his
employment with good cause attributable to his employing
unit, but could not so hold because, in this case, it was the
union, not the company, which was at fault. 5 This argument
is weak, however, in view of the circuit courts' consistent hold-
ings that an employer as much as a union has a duty to ac-
commodate. The fact that the union fails to meet its obliga-
tion does not mean that the employer is thereby relieved of
responsibility.
Finally, the dissent expressed sympathy for the discrimi-
nation that Nottelson had suffered, but maintained that his
remedy should have been sought in the federal courts and not
in the form of state unemployment compensation." Noting
that he had been granted judgment in his federal action, 7 the
dissent suggested that the majority wanted to grant him a
double recovery. The Nottelson decision may or may not have
that effect in view of the split in authority on whether unem-
ployment compensation should be deducted from a back pay
award in a Title VII action."8 The more significant point
which this argument raises is how far the state unemployment
commission can be called upon to consider federal legislation
when making its judgments.
One argument which the dissent might well have raised,
but did not, is language in Hanmer v. ILHR Departments
which initially appears to be a direct contradiction of Nottel-
son. In Hanmer, the owners/employees of a small business
94. 94 Wis. 2d at 126, 287 N.W.2d at 773.
95. Id. at 126-27, 287 N.W.2d at 773.
96. Id. at 127, 287 N.W.2d at 773.
97. See note 13 supra.
98. See Annot., 21 A.L.R. Fed. 472, 539-40 (1974); 2 A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT Dis-
CRIMINATION § 55.37(c) (1979 and Supplement).
99. 92 Wis. 2d 90, 94, 284 N.W.2d 587, 589 (1979).
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had filed for bankruptcy and then applied for unemployment
compensation. In affirming DILHR's rejection of the claim on
the basis that the owners/employees had voluntarily termi-
nated, the court said: "In determining whether an employee
voluntarily terminated his employment ... whatever justifi-
cation he may have had for doing so is not relevant. The ini-
tial question is not why the employee terminated his employ-
ment, but whether he in fact did so." °10 The court went on to
say that justification is relevant to the issue of whether termi-
nation was for good cause attributable to the employing
unit.10' Presumably, the majority in Nottelson would main-
tain that the term, "justification," in Hanmer is used in the
sense of personal reasons for actions rather-than in the sense
of an "exemption" from a particular requirement. So while
the claimants in Hanmer may have had compelling business
reasons for filing for bankruptcy, they nevertheless intended
to terminate their employment. However, Nottelson, under
Title VII, was exempt from the requirement to pay union
dues and so by refusing to pay them, he did not intend to
terminate his employment.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Nottelson, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed a de-
cision of DILHR's denying unemployment compensation to a
worker who was discharged for failing to pay union dues. De-
scribed in this manner, the case is hardly an unusual one. In-
deed, there are elements of the decision which follow tradi-
tional patterns. For example, the court spent some time
reviewing the problems presented by mixed questions of law
and fact, cited case authority for its view that this situation
presented a question of law (although acknowledging that pre-
cedent is far from consistent in this area) and then detailed
the reason for its substitution of judgment. The court also re-
affirmed the traditional case law definition of the crucial stat-
utory concept in the case, "voluntary termination."
What makes this case unusual is the reason for claimant's
refusal to pay union dues - a religious belief. DILHR, the
circuit court and the dissent all viewed the case as one where
100. Id. (footnote omitted).
101. 92 Wis. 2d at 94 n.2, 284 N.W.2d at 589 n.2.
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an employee voluntarily terminated his employment for a per-
sonal reason. But, as noted, the Unemployment Compensation
Act no longer recognizes a "compelling personal reason" as an
exemption to the voluntary termination disqualification. The
Nottelson majority, however, attached a different and crucial
significance to this "reason." The majority held that the reli-
gious nature of the refusal to pay dues triggered the involve-
ment of the federal Civil Rights Act. And once this federal
legislation was called into play, it could, under the right fact
situation, relieve an employee of the obligation to pay dues.
The majority held that the instant case presented such a fact
situation - that there was a reasonable basis to believe that
Nottelson need not pay dues; that he had not acted inconsis-
tently with the employment relationship; and that he had not,
therefore, voluntarily terminated.
The problem this decision presents for DILHR is manifest.
Read narrowly, the decision requires the department to in-
quire into the meritoriousness of an employee's excuse for
particular conduct in light of federal legislation and its judi-
cial interpretation when there is a conflict between Title VII
and a union security clause. Read broadly, however, the deci-
sion requires DILHR to develop an expertise in (and to con-
sider in future decisions) all federal legislation relating to em-
ployment discrimination and its rapidly developing
interpretation in federal case law.102 So broad a mandate
could easily require funding for additional personnel. That, in
turn, would involve the legislature. In view of the closeness of
the decision, it seems likely that the department may wait for
further direction from the court or the legislature before un-
dertaking such an expanded role.
KATHLEEN A. GRAY
LABOR LAW-Fair Representation-Punitive Dam-
ages in Fair Representation Actions. IBEW v. Foust,
442 U.S. 42 (1979). Nearly forty years ago, in Steele v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R., 1 the United States Supreme
102. See notes 68, 85 & 88 supra.
1. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
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